WW2 British & commonwealth trucks and cars
About 1,500,000 vehicles of all types between the interwar and 1945
Bedford QLD
The topic of British trucks in World War Two had been much neglected postwar, with the few and most succint publications going back some 40 years old, and not covering all aspects of the topic. We can cite however Les Freathy's book by Tankograd Publishing recently but that's about it. Ths goal of this current page is to analyse manufacturers and their designs, the major truck types used by the British Royal Army in WW2 and their variants but also artillery tractors, and staff cars, knowing that any armoured variants should be treated in Tank Encyclopedia. Wish me luck in this different topic that i expect to cover between books and open internet sources.
David Bocquelet, Tank, Naval and Truck Encyclopedia
Chevy/GM/Ford CMP models only
Heavy Carriers of the British Army
Trailers and Tractors. All from pinterest. What to expect, and much more...
British Trucks summary
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AEC Matador
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AEC Armoured Command Vehicle (415)
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Albion CX 22S
-Albion WD.CX24 Tank Transporter
-Austin K2/Y Ambulance (13,102)
-Austin K3/YF (Cargo Truck)
-Austin K30 (Cargo Truck)
-Austin K4/Dropside
-Austin K5
-Austin K6 GS/Gantry
-Bedford MW
-Bedford OXA Armoured
-Bedford OXC Semi-trailer
-Bedford OXD GS
-Bedford OYC Tanker
-Bedford OYD GS
-Bedford QLB Bofors
-Bedford QLD GS
-Bedford QLR/QLC Radio/communications
-Bedford QLT Troop carrier
-Crossley Q-Type
-Guy Ant
-Guy Lizard Armoured Command Vehicle (21 built)
-Humber FWD.
-Karrier K6
-Leyland Hippo Mk II
-Morris CS.8 (15cwt)
-Morris PU.8 (10cwt)
-Morris C4 (15cwt)
-Morris ML Ambulance
-Morris C8 FAT
-Morris Commercial CD series
-Morris Commercial CS8
-Morris Commercial 8x8 GS Terrapin amphibious truck (500)
-Scammell Pioneer TRCU
-Scammell Pioneer SV1S/T
-Scammell Pioneer R-100
Quick Brief on interwar truck manufacturers
Key Interwar Manufacturers (Quick Profiles):
Bedford: Founded in 1931. Mass production, US style. Standardized components. Becomes the backbone of British WWII truck supply
Leyland & AEC: Heavy trucks and buses, Strong diesel expertise, Later key players in military heavy transport (tanks and aircraft)
Thornycroft & Dennis: Quality engineering but smaller production volumes with a strong military heritage.
Morris Commercial: Light and medium trucks for 15-cwt and 30-cwt classes
Foden & Sentinel: Steam specialists: Arty Tractors, but they declined rapidly once diesel proves superior.
Almost every British WWII soft-skin vehicle has an interwar civilian ancestor, with civilian load ratings, a road-focused design, limited cross-country capability early in the war explaining the early British Royal Army WWII breakdown issues. This led to a rapid wartime design simplification with trucks improving dramatically after 1941.
An overview of British interwar truck production
Legacy Trucks (1918–1929)
Between the wars, Britain went from small-batch, semi-artisan lorry building to a mass-production, standardized truck industry — but without heavy military standardization until very late. Civilian trucks dominated, and the army largely adapted what already existed. In the Immediate Post-WWI Situation (1919–mid-1920s) as Britain emerged from WWI with many small manufacturers, there as experience, but postwar economic led to smaller productions. However the companies could capitalize on strong experience in wartime improvisation and raeal innovation on off-road suspensions, gearboxes and tires. There was a limited mass-production infrastructure however, still, compared to the USA. Most WWI trucks were obsolescent in the 1920s, in small numbers and from too many companies, often steam-powered or chain-drive with 1–3 tons typical payloads. They were built using a ladder frame with solid rubber tyres. New pneumatic tyres were being slowly introduced. Chain drives were still common. The Engines were most often side-valve petrol types and diesels were were rare until the 1930s.
Now as for the British Army, it shrunk dramatically after WWI and there was little budget or appetite for new vehicle development. It relied on now worn out and obsolescent surplus WWI vehicles or civilian lorries impressed during emergencies. Civilian was First, Military Second in production. British truck makers only built for commercial needs, with creature comforts and no ness for off-road features. The Major manufacturers active in 1929, just as the crisis was near, were Leyland, AEC, Thornycroft, Albion, Foden (notably steam wagons), Dennis, Commer, Austin (still more car-focused), Morris Commercial (emerging late 1920s), delivering Urban delivery lorries
and municipal vehicles such as refuse trucks and fire engines and for the largest roads, long-haul steam wagons, still important in Britain with the first articulated trailers starting to appear. Tendencies were a gradual shift from the chain drive to shaft drive, from solid tyres to pneumatics. The debate of steam vs petrol raged on as the first remained viable much longer in Britain than elsewhere. Foden and Sentinel were still major players for these.
Early Military Truck Policy (1920s–early 1930s)
The Army’s mindset had no equivalent to the later German or Soviet standardization programs and preferred to buying commercial trucks, making minor military adaptations but focusing on reliability, ease of maintenance, compatibility with civilian spares, resulting in a nightmare variety of makes and models in service, minimal interchangeability and almost no purpose-built military truck designs. This philosophy directly explains the logistical chaos of early WWII. Next was a phase of consolidation and modernization as smaller firms disappear or are absorbed and survivors scale up production, with stronger ties to automotive mass production methods.
Key developments were at Bedford (Vauxhall/GM) with more serious military trucks in 1931, and introducing US-style manufacturing efficiency. Morris Commercial also expanded rapidly and Austin increased its commercial vehicle output, mostly ton answer a booming civilian demand. Payload norms stabilize at 15-cwt (¾-ton) or 30-cwt (1½-ton) and 3-ton. Diesel engines became increasingly common in heavy lorries, notably at AEC and Leyland. Brakes, suspensions, electrics improve dramatically as well.
Late Interwar Military Thinking (1936–1939)
With Germany rearming, alarm bells starts to ring, leading to a gradual rearmament in britain as the army suddendly realizes it lacks enough trucks and its existing fleet is too diverse. Worse, there was little time for a for a clean-sheet military truck program. The solutionw as a rapid militarization of existing civilian designs directly leading to Bedford offering its standard MW/OX and OY models, off-road and militarized, as well as the Morris CS8 and Austin K-series, as well as Commer and Albion military conversions, still interwar civilian trucks adapted under pressure.
WW2 British and commonwealth transportation
British and Commonwealth transportation in WWII was highly centralized and still administratively heavy, deliberately unflexible. Instead of every unit owning its trucks, transport was pooled, controlled, and allocated as the HQ needed, a top down approach completelty invert to German or US practice. This philosophy shaped everything.
Pre-War Foundations (1930s Thinking)
The British mindset for Transport resulted in a branch that was expensive, hard to maintain overseas, vulnerable to a very tight logsitic approach with little tolerance for non-regulatory or planned scheduled, useless in times of emergencies. It was heavily Centralized and its park was not given up to units more what was absolutely needed, even answering to the ministry of transports cotas. By 1939 fighting units had organic transport only for: immediate tactical needs and everything else came from higher-level transport formations. This state helped to understanding British logistics at the sart of the war. Those who control it were:
Royal Army Service Corps (RASC)
This was the backbone of British Army transport. Responsible for road transport by trucks and lorrries, supply delivery (food, fuel, ammunition), troop movement and workshops (initially, before REME). It did not fight and only moved the armyl vealing some glaring loopholes in operations. Almost any British or Commonwealth soft-skin vehicle in WWII belongs to the RASC or its colonial equivalent.
Transport Organization
As the transport branches existed at several layers, each doing different jobs, there was the :
Unit (First-Line) Transport
Transporting everything needed in Infantry battalions, Artillery regiments and Armoured units, moving ammunition from dump to gun line but also tools, rations, unit stores and it was tailored for short-range movement, typically operating 15-cwt trucks, Jeeps, light trailers. Units never had enough vehicles to move themselves completely.
Formation Transport (Second-Line)
It was controlled at the Brigade, Division, Corps levels, with vast reserves to reinforce unit transport, handle routine supply runs on longer distances (from port to depots for example), move heavier loads, operating 30-cwt trucks, 3-ton lorries, Tank transporters for the Armoured Division and sub-levels.
Both were still controlled by the RASC which allocated assets temporarily to units. This is where British flexibility shines but also bureaucracy:
Army & GHQ Transport (Third-Line)
This did the heavy lifting, from port to railhead and to forward dumps, with ammunition columns, fuel supply (POL units) and for large-scale troop movements before a major offensive. It was sub-divided into RASC Transport Companies grouped into transport Columns and later Transport Regiments, operating mostly 3-ton lorries, specialized tankers and heavy tractors. This level made operations like El Alamein and Normandy possible.
Specialized Transport Units
These were tasked of carrying Petrol, Oil & Lubricants, notably to armoured divisions, mobile (motorized) infantry and rear lines worksjip and field repair units, or petrol supply units, not only for the Army but also for the RAF in some cases. It had dedicated tanker units and fuel was often moved forward faster than ammunition.
British logistics put a premium on fuel security with Ammunition Companies separate from general supply under a strict control, routing, and timing, critical for artillery-heavy doctrine
Recovery & Repair: Initially under RASC, later REME (from 1942) it was tasked of recovering trucks, breakdown lorries, mobile workshops.
Then, there was the intermodal levels, rail, sea & port transport. Railways were used whenever possible, they were great to carry entire units in one go, including armoured divisions, as tanks were easiler to transport by rail than with specialized tractors and trailers, which often took over at the station to the frontline or a depot close to it. Military Railway Operating Companies were constitured to reduced truck wear and fuel use.
Ports & beaches saw the constitution of Port operating units, often RASC and Royal Engineers, tasked notably to re-established devastated infrasttructure (like restoring French, Belgium and Dutch ports at D-Day plus. They used DUKWs and later supplemented this by road transport. This led to operating beach Groups in amphibious operations. British logistics often had the typical patten of sea to rail to road.
Commonwealth Logistics
Canada had the same structure as Britain and its own Canadian Army Service Corps (CASC) made a heavy use of CMP trucks, Canadian-made with US components (Ford, Dodge, Chevrolet, GM). They often supplied British units as well.
Australia did the same, with the Australian Army Service Corps (AASC) but it was more decentralized in jungle warfare and under the influence of US logistics, far more flexible and closer to frontline units. It made greater use of smaller trucks and was keen on local improvisation, or pack transport where roads failed in the Jungle. In North Africa, it became adept at repairing and using axis vehicles.
New Zealand & India also followed British doctrine closely. Indian Army developed a huge transport expertise due to the terrain, the climate and scale of operations.
Practical Case: British Infantry Transport in NW Europe 1944
A typical British Infantry Division needed more than its organic unit transport, it was insufficient to move an entire division. Divisional RASC companie handle daily supply and corps transported ammunition and fuel forward.
At the upper Army level, it brought everything from ports. To move the division fully, transport had to be temporarily massed from multiple levels, constraining British advances to be very methodical, but devastating once momentum built as shown by El Alamein.
Strengths & Weaknesses of the British System
On the pros, the RASC made a very efficient use of limited vehicles. It still allowed for a flexible allocation of the parks, and made it easier to managed maintenance and spares control. It scaled well across the Commonwealth. Weaknesses were it was paperwork-heavy and had a slower reaction in fluid situations. It made the best of early-war shortages that were crippling but it also depended on experienced staff officers.
It Mattered and explained why Britain needed so many trucks, why standardization (Bedford, CMP) became vital and why logistics rarely collapsed despite global operations. It also led to British operations which emphasized planning over improvisation. It was low-moving but unstopppable when setup.
British & Commonwealth armies didn’t just fight battles — they scheduled them.